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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J. 
KOHLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
STEPHEN C. MARTIN, 
Defendant. 
Civil No: 7122 
Judge: Guy R. Burningkam 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge 
in the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994. 
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in 
the premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are the owners of a residence and real property in Midway City, 
Wasatch County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East 
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning. 
2. The Defendant is a resident of Midway City, Wasatch County, State of Utah, and 
the owner of a residence and real property therein, more particularly described as follows: 
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Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.25 chains from the Southeast 
corner of the Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 12 minutes West 56.1 
feet; thence North 648.6 feet to the South line of the Eugene Probst property; 
thence Easterly 319.44 feet to a point 362.34 feet North of the Northeast corner 
of Harold Fabian's property; thence South 362.34 feet; thence North 89 degrees 
12 minutes West 132.1 feet, thence South 11.5 feet; thence West 132 feet; thence 
South to the point of beginning. 
3. The real property of the Plaintiffs and that of the Defendant are adjacent to each 
other and abut along the West and North boundaries of the Plaintiffs' land. Defendant's deed 
includes title to a substantial portion of a roadway lying to the West and extending Southward 
from the Plaintiffs' land which connects with Second North Street. The relationship of 
Plaintiffs' and Defendant's properties and the roadway are illustrated by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15(A), a copy of which is attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and made a part hereof by 
reference. 
4. The Court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the roadway adjacent to 
Plaintiffs' real property and extending northward from the intersection of Second North Street 
and Second West Street of Midway City to a line extended westerly from the north side of 
Plaintiffs' asphalt driveway where it enters the Plaintiffs' property was historically and 
continuously used by the general public as a public thoroughfare for far in excess of a 10 year 
period of time. The width of the thoroughfare area extended from fences along its west side and 
east side which are still in their historic locations. The entire thoroughfare area was used by the 
general public both for passage of people and animals and for the travel and parking of vehicles. 
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The use of the thoroughfare by the public was not only in connection with the use of the land 
now owned by the Plaintiffs, but also for access by the public to the lands north of the properties 
of these parties. The thoroughfare area was always open for the free and unobstructed passage 
of people and vehicles from its south end northward past the Plaintiffs' land from before 1922 
to at least 1948. The said thoroughfare area is now used and claimed by Plaintiffs for access 
to and the use of their property. 
5. The public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of Defendant is described as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property 
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324 
of Wasatch County Records); 
Thence N 89°12'00" W a distance of 56.10 feet to Paul Wilson 
property line; thence North along said property line a distance of 
277 feet more or less to a point at the intersection of a line 
extended westerly along the North side of an Asphalt driveway 
entering the Marden Kohler property; thence West along said 
extended line a distance of 56.09 feet to the West property line of 
Marden Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler property 
boundary a distance of 277 feet more or less to the point of 
beginning. 
6. The roadway thoroughfare established by public usage has never been abandoned 
or vacated by order of any highway authorities having jurisdiction over the roadway, or by other 
competent authority. 
7. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiffs predecessors 
in title, the Buhler family, operated a commercial swimming facility with two pools and a store 
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upon the land now owned and occupied by the Plaintiffs' residence. The Buhler's facilities were 
known as the Buhler's Hot Pots, and although they never owned the land upon which the 
roadway is located, the roadway was used for many years, far in excess of 10 years, by the 
general public as a thoroughfare for access and egress and parking of vehicles going to the 
Buhler facilities and also for access to the land north of those facilities which was a popular 
geologic and thermal spring area known as the "Mound". The entire roadway was used for such 
purposes and is the same roadway as is now used by the Plaintiffs for access to their property. 
The roadway has been regularly used by Plaintiffs' and their parents, Reed and Elda Kohler for 
access to their property since the summer of 1966. The roadway was always open without 
obstruction to the free passage of the public and vehicles. 
8, The Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that in the summer of 1966, prior 
to purchasing the land where they built their home, Plaintiffs' parents, Reed and Elda Kohler 
approached William Ferrin Whitaker and Martha B. Whitaker (who were then the owners of the 
land now owned by Defendant) and sought their permission to use the roadway for access to 
what is now Plaintiffs land if they were to buy it and build their home there. That land 
formerly occupied by Buhler's Hot Pots, would otherwise have been landlocked. The Whitakers 
were aware of all the material facts and agreed and gave their permission intending it to be 
permanent and without restriction or limitation. Reed and Elda Kohler then bought the land in 
August 1966 and immediately thereafter built their home on it in reasonable reliance upon the 
permission and easement that had been granted by the Whitakers. The Kohlers had the 
continuous, regular and uninterrupted use of the roadway from the summer of 1966 until July 
29, 1992, when Defendant put a padlock on a gate he had recently installed near the South end 
of the roadway. Until Defendant locked the gate there had been no effort by Defendant or any 
of his predecessors in title to withdraw permission for use of the roadway. Defendant's action 
in installing and locking the gate, caused significant detriment to Plaintiffs and if allowed to 
resume or continue, would cause Plaintiffs and their tenants irreparable harm, including harm 
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to health and safety and this court entered a preliminary injunction in this action on September 
21, 1992 requiring Defendant to unlock the gate and cease interfering with Plaintiffs' and their 
tenants use of the roadway. 
9. The Whitakers had asphalted and improved the road before granting Kohlers 
permission to use it. After the Kohlers had built and were occupying their home, the Whitakers 
first communicated to Reed Kohler a demand that he pay the Whitakers for a percentage of the 
value of the land in the roadway, a percentage of the cost of the improvements the Whitakers 
had installed, and to share in the future maintenance. Hda Kohler was not a party to that 
conversation and never agreed to make the payment demanded. Reed Kohler never made 
payment and died on June 9, 1969. The Whitakers thereafter continued to repeatedly make 
demands upon Hda Kohler for payment for the land and improvements, thereby manifesting that 
her continued use of the roadway was adverse to their interests. 
10. In April of 1972 the Whitakers presented to Elda Kohler a formal written proposal 
for an agreement for payment for and use of the roadway. Elda Kohler never agreed to the 
proposal but continued the regular use of the roadway. The Whitakers never interrupted or 
objected to her use of the roadway although they continued to demand payment during the entire 
time they owned the land now owned by Defendant. Elda Kohler's use of the roadway was 
open, notorious, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted from April of 1972. The Whitakers 
failure to pursue their claim for payment effectively waived any rights they may have had to 
collect payment for the land and improvements. 
11. On December 9, 1980, the Whitakers deeded their land to their brother and sister-
in-law Richard Fred Bassett and Karen E. Bassett, who had knowledge of the use of the roadway 
and easement by the Kohlers. The lay of the land, the asphalt surfacing and improvements made 
it apparent that the roadway was the means of access to the Kohler residence and had been used 
over a long number of years. The location of the Kohlers attached garage facing onto the 
roadway and the asphalt driveways extending from the asphalt of the roadway to the Kohler 
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garage contributed to make the Kohler use open, visible, notorious and adverse. Their use was 
regular, continuous, unobstructed and uninterrupted during the ownership of the land by 
Bassetts. The Bassetts never gave permission for the use of the roadway by Elda Kohler or the 
Plaintiffs which use was clearly adverse as to the Bassetts. 
12. On April 10, 1980, Elda Kohler deeded her land and residence to the Plaintiffs 
although she continued to live in the home and use the roadway until 1992. Elda Kohler and 
Plaintiffs continued to have the uninterrupted and unobstructed regular and continuous use of the 
roadway thereafter. 
13. At the end of 1987, the Bassetts deeded the land and roadway to the Defendant, 
Stephen C. Martin, who likewise had knowledge of the use of the roadway and easement by the 
Kohlers. The circumstances were unchanged from what they were during the ownership by the 
Bassetts. Defendant never gave permission for use by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs use of the 
roadway continued regularly, continuously and uninterrupted and unobstructed and was also 
open, visible, notorious and adverse to the Defendant until he locked the gate on July 29, 1992. 
14. Plaintiffs and their parents had the open and unrestricted use of the roadway 
adversely to Defendant and his predecessors in title for over 20 years (from April 1972 when 
Whitakers first demanded payment for the land and improvements until July 29, 1992 when 
Defendant locked the metal gate he installed near the south end of the roadway). Defendant 
installed the gate in April 1992, but the Kohlers and their tenants continued unrestricted use of 
the roadway until Defendant locked it with a padlock on July 29, 1992. 
15. The Court finds that Defendant has harassed the Plaintiffs and their tenants and 
invitees in the use of the roadway and thoroughfare, that his actions in installing and locking the 
metal gate causing the necessity for the Preliminary Injunction to be entered in this action was 
in violation of Plaintiffs rights and give rise to the necessity that this Court enter its order and 
a permanent injunction requiring that Defendant forthwith remove the gate and its metal posts, 
from in any way obstructing the free and open usage by persons and vehicles of the roadway as 
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described herein and from interfering in any way with the use by Plaintiffs, their successors and 
assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others from the free 
and open use of the roadway for access, egress and parking in connection with the use of 
Plaintiffs' property and this Court should enter its order to restore them to their free and open 
usage of the roadway and thoroughfare. Defendant should likewise be restrained from harassing 
in any way or causing problems for Plaintiffs and such other persons in the use of the roadway 
and thoroughfare. 
16. There have been feelings generated between the parties such that the Plaintiffs 
should also be restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems with the Defendants' use 
of his land so long as his use does not interfere with their rights and Plaintiffs should exercise 
their influence to prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members. 
17. The parties have in the past shared in the care and maintenance of the portion of 
the roadway from its north boundary described in paragraph 5 of these findings down to the 
north boundary of Second North Street of Midway City. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors 
have in the past done the care by way of mowing and watering on the east side of the asphalt 
surfacing and the Defendant has done it on the West side. There is a need that the parties 
should continue to share in the care and maintenance in that way. As to any need for 
maintenance or repair of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines there is such a need, 
he should be ordered to determine a time frame for the work and obtain a bid and submit it to 
Plaintiffs for approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin. If Plaintiffs do 
not approve of the bid or if Defendant fails to obtain a bid for work Plaintiffs deem necessary, 
Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest 
responsible bidder and the parties shall share equally in the cost. 
18. The Court does not find that Defendant's defense of this action was without merit 
and entered in bad faith as to the substance of the case, however, the Court should reserve for 
later determination the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court 
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heretofore entered in this action as well as the question of the award of attorney fees in 
connection therewith. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The roadway which is the subject of this action and that portion of Defendant's 
land as described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact in this action became and still 
is a public thoroughfare under the provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended; and as such the Plaintiffs, and their successors in interest in their land are entitled 
to the free and unobstructed permanent use of the roadway for access and egress and vehicular 
travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property which 
land is more particularly described in Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact. 
2. Plaintiffs are the owners of an easement and right of way over and upon the 
roadway described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact, William Ferrin Whitaker and 
Martha B. Whitaker, the then owners of the fee title to the roadway granted the easement, by 
oral agreement which was acted and relied upon by Reed and Elda Kohler and established a 
permanent and unrestricted easement for use of the roadway. The Kohlers reliance upon that 
grant of easement by their use of the roadway and constructing their substantial home made that 
grant of easement irrevocable. They and the Plaintiffs have continued to use the roadway for 
over 27 years in reliance upon that grant of easement. The Kohler land is the dominant estate 
and the Defendant's land the servient estate in relation to that easement. Plaintiffs and their 
successors have the right to that permanent easement which is a right which runs with their land 
for the continued permanent use of the easement and roadway. 
3. The Court also concludes as a matter of law that the doctrines of promissory 
estoppel and equity apply to the facts of this case to prevent Defendant from withdrawal of the 
promise and agreement of his predecessors, the Whitakers, granting the Kohlers the permanent 
use of the roadway by reason of the following elements: 
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a. The promise and agreement was reasonable expected to induce reliance by 
the Kohlers. 
b. The Kohlers reasonably relied upon and took action in reliance upon the 
promise and agreement by buying their land, building their home and using the roadway. 
c. There would be significant and substantial detriment to the Plaintiffs for 
the Defendant to be allowed to withdraw the permission and agreement. 
d. The promissors, the Whitakers, were aware of all material facts. 
4. The Court further finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have established that they 
also own a prescriptive easement for the permanent and unrestricted use of that portion of the 
roadway upon Defendant's land as described in Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact for the 
continued use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use 
of their residence and real property which perscriptive easement is a right which runs with the 
land. 
5. The Court should enter its permanent restraining order and order for the care and 
maintenance for the roadway and thoroughfare as set forth in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
DATED and signed this _ /2-day of April, 1995. , ^;.;;,;/,.,. 
Approved as to form: 
Robert Felton 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J. 
KOHLER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEPHEN C. MARTIN, : 
Defendant. : 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
Civil No: 7122 
Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge 
of the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994. 
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in 
the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS NOW THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are granted judgment that the roadway on the west and adjacent to 
Plaintiffs' real property is a public thoroughfare extending northward from the intersection of 
Second North Street and Second West Street of Midway City, Utah to a line extended westerly 
along the north side of the asphalt driveway where it enters Plaintiffs' real property. That 
portion of the public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of the Defendant and to which 
Defendants' land is subject is described as follows: 
on 
Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast 
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property 
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324 
of Wasatch County Records); 
Thence N 89°12'00H W a distance of 56.10 feet to 
Paul Wilson property line; thence North along said 
property line a distance of 277 feet more or less to 
a point at the intersection of a line extended 
westerly along the North side of an Asphalt 
driveway entering the Marden Kohler property; 
thence West along said extended line a distance of 
56.09 feet to the West property line of Marden 
Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler 
property boundary a distance of 277 feet more or 
less to the point of beginning; 
2. Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of the right to the free 
and unobstructed permanent use of the said public thoroughfare for access and egress and 
vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property 
which is more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East 
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. Plaintiffs rights to the use of said public thoroughfare are rights that are 
appurtenant to and run with their land and may be conveyed to their successors in interest. 
4. Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of a private easement and 
right of way acquired both by a grant of easement and by prescriptive easement over and upon 
the said roadway and thoroughfare and specifically that portion of Defendant's land described 
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in Paragraph 1 above. Said easement and right of way is for the unobstructed and permanent 
use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with Plaintiffs' real 
property described in Paragraph 2 above. Plaintiffs' right to said easement is hereby quieted in 
them and is a permanent right that is appurtenant to and runs with their land and can be 
conveyed to their successors in interest. 
5. The Defendant is hereby ordered to forthwith remove the metal gate and gateposts 
he caused to be installed upon the roadway and thoroughfare that is the subject of this action and 
is hereby permanently enjoined from in any way obstructing the free and open travel by persons 
and vehicles upon any portions of the roadway from Second North Street northward to the north 
line of the land described in Paragraph 1 above. Defendant is further permanently enjoined from 
interfering with, harassing or otherwise causing problems in any with the use by Plaintiffs, their 
successors and assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others 
from the free and open use of the roadway and thoroughfare for access, egress and parking of 
vehicles in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' property. 
6. The Plaintiffs are hereby restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems 
with Defendant's use of the roadway and his land so long as that use does not interfere with 
their rights. Plaintiffs are further ordered to strive to exercise what influence they can to 
prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members. 
7. It is ordered in relation to the care, maintenance and repairs of the improvements 
in the roadway and thoroughfare for the area described in Paragraph 1 above the parties shall 
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continue the practice of sharing in such work, such that Plaintiff will do the care, mowing 
watering and maintenance on the east side of the asphalt surfacing and Defendant shall do it on 
the west side. As to repair or maintenance of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines 
there is such a need, he shall set a reasonable time frame and obtain a bid for the work and 
submit it to Plaintiffs for their approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin. 
If Plaintiffs do not approve of the bid or timing for the work or if Defendant fails to obtain a 
bid for work Plaintiffs deem is necessary, Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to 
Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder and the parties shall share 
equally in the cost. 
8. Plaintiffs are granted their costs in this action. 
9, The Court reserves for later determination in this action the issues raised by the 
Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court heretofore entered in this action as well as the 
question of the award of attorney fees in connection therewith. 
DATED and signed this ^f day ofN^cmlcK 199^ 
Approved as to form: 
Robert Felton 
State of Utah ^ 
County of Wasatch ) 
I, the undersigned, clerk of the district court of Wasatch 
County, Utah, do hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing 
is a true and full copy of an original document on file in my* 
office as such clerk. <i 
Witness my hand and seal of said court this 2 & J ^ 
^ 
1 
4 -SK 
By: LUL T^n^1 f/YiftV^ \ % * uwuiwfjp? A .#* 
ROBERT FELTON, #1056 
Attorney for Defendant 
39 Exchange Place, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5835 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARDEN R. KOHLER and 
JOY J. KOHLER, : MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
OR TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
: Civil No. 7122 
vs. 
Judge GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
STEPHEN C. MARTIN, : 
Defendant. 
ROBERT FELTON, Attorney for the Defendant hereby moves this 
Court to grant a new trial or to amend the judgment in the above-
entitled action. This motion is submitted pursuant to Rule 59 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. There was significant irregularity in theses proceedings 
in allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint after the trial 
was completed. Said action severely prejudiced the Defendant since 
he had no knowledge concerning the claim of estoppel and was 
prevented from eliciting testimony or calling witnesses to meet 
this issue. This action also surprised the defense. 
2. The Court's finding that a public thoroughfare existed 
constitutes an error in law and was not supported by the evidence. 
3. The Court's finding of a prescriptive easement was not 
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supported by the evidence and was an error in law. 
4. The Court7s findings that the prior owner had given 
permission and that permission was binding on Stephen Martin was 
not supported by the evidence and is error. 
5. This motion is based upon the memorandum of law submitted 
herewith. 
DATED this ) / day of January, 1995. 
ROBERT FELTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this J J day of January, 1995, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL OR TO AMEND JUDGMENT to A. DEAN JEFFS, Attorney at Law, P.O. 
Box 888, Provo, Utah 84603. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARDEN KOHLER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STEPHEN C. MARTIN, 
Defendant 
COURT'S FINDINGS 
TRIAL 
CASE #7122 
HON. GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th and 14th 
days of October, 1994 this matter came on for trial 
before the HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM, Judge of 
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1 it clearly on both counts* And we'll submit it. 
2 COURT'S FINDINGS 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Let me ask a 
4 couple of questions for you to think about, and 
5 I've thought about and are troubling me a little 
6 bit, as you prepare to further advise me on the 
7 law, not just the estoppel. In doing this I'm 
8 going to make some findings. 
9 I do find by clear and convincing evidence 
10 that a public thoroughfare was created by the 
11 general public use from, help me out on the 
12 streets, Second North. Excuse me, and is it 
13 Second--
14 MR. FELTON: West, I believe. 
15 THE COURT: West. Up to approximately the 
16 area that the large tree is now. That seems to be 
17 almost parallel to where the pool was. It will 
18 include the driveway, a portion of the entire 
19 driveway presently being used by the Kohlers. 
20 The question I have, and I'm going to make 
21 a finding here, that insofar as the public use is 
22 concerned, the public abandoned their use of it 
23 somewhere around, or shortly after, 1948. I cannot 
24 find by clear and convincing evidence that 
25 otherwise there's a public thoroughfare created. 
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1 Now, the statutes seem quite clear, that 
2 in order for the abandonment of that public use by 
3 the governmental entity to occur, that some action 
4 by competent authority would have to occur. And 
5 that has not happened. 
6 There's a case footnoted in 27-12-90 that 
7 1 haven't read yet, but it peaked my interest. 
8 MR. FELTON: Is it Osguthorpe? 
9 THE COURT: It's Mallory vs. Taggert. 
10 Says: "Corporation was able to give good 
11 title to land platted for streets and 
12 alleyways but never used as such since 
13 under proviso in former law, road not 
14 used or worked for five years ceased 
15 to be a highway." 
16 I'm not sure what that means. I'm not sure 
17 what the case says. It's a 1970 case. I don't 
18 even know if it's still good law as far as Shepards 
19 is concerned. But, it peaked my interest to wonder 
20 if there is case law that in some way does allow 
21 the public, who created the public way, can then 
22 abandon that public way through their discontinuing 
23 their public use. 
24 So having made those two findings, I'll 
25 let you help me out on the law. If the only way 
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1 II it can be abandoned is through competent authority, 
2 || then it's a public way up to about the tree, but 
3 II not beyond. 
4 I don't see that the uses that I heard 
5 about, although they were over a long period of 
6 time, they were somewhat sporadic. And for the 
7 most part, including the slaughterhouse, were for 
8 the benefit of the owner of title of the land. 
9 The Abegglens leased the property to 
10 Mr. Kohler who ran the processing plant. And so 
11 any use would have been really for the benefit of 
12 the property owner anyway, not a public use. 
13 That falls within the cases too, that 
14 invitees even of, and business dealings with the 
15 owner of the property that crossed that property 
16 can't create that public use. 
17 As to the Buehler property, they never 
18 owned this way. And there, the general public did 
19 come and brought horses and buggies, there were tie 
20 posts there. And when the automobiles became more 
21 popular I do find by clear and convincing evidence 
22 that they were parked up there right within the 
23 right-of-way that we're talking about and as high 
24 as the tree and the portion of the driveway 
25 presently being used by the Kohlers. The Buehlers 
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1 || never owned that property. 
2 || These public ways have to have a terminus 
3 II sometime. And when we say it led nowhere, it led 
4 to that point. And they arrived there and parked, 
5 not only for swimming but also to go up for their 
6 picnics and hiking. And school children came down 
7 that way to go to school. Again, I'm not sure that 
8 it would have created more than a footpath at that. 
9 And maybe it's my poor eyesight, but I 
10 can't see from the aerial photographs the evidence, 
11 and we didn't go up on the site and look at it. 
12 Perhaps being there-- I had a similar case in this 
13 county where we went up and the road was apparent. 
14 There were still ruts and, although it hadn't been 
15 used for a long time. 
16 But I do find it was used for vehicular 
17 traffic. 
18 I guess I have another concern raised by 
19 your rebuttal, Mr. Jeffs, where you say these are 
20 not mutually exclusive. If it is a public way I'm 
21 not sure an individual can adverse the government. 
22 And so the things that would apply, either by way 
23 of promissory estoppel or by prescriptive easement 
24 may not have the same application as against the 
25 city or town. 
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1 II So we're getting into the dilemma that I 
2 || think, it's beyond the dilemma you were talking 
3 II about, the one that I'm struggling with now. Let 
4 me go on. 
5 I find by preponderance of the evidence 
6 that the Kohlers, this being Reed and Elda Kohler, 
7 approached the Whitakers, Ferrin and Martha, and 
8 sought permission to use the right-of-way. The 
9 same portion that they ended up using for the 
10 driveway to their home. 
11 I find they relied upon that, they built 
12 their home in reliance upon that and began using 
13 the right-of-way upon that reliance. 
14 I do find that sometime later Ferrin and 
15 Martha Whitaker did present an agreement. I think 
16 I've got the wrong exhibit here, I'm not sure. 
17 MR. A. DEAN JEFFS: I believe that's 
18 EXHIBIT 13. 
19 THE COURT: Well, they presented the 
20 agreement to Elda Kohler. I think the testimony 
21 was that, a verbal agreement. And let me make this 
22 finding. 
23 I do find that a verbal agreement was 
24 presented to Mr. Reed Kohler which sought 
25 contribution from him for one half of the costs of 
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1 II the improvements that had already been made to the 
2 II lane, and an agreement to share costs in future 
3 maintenance and improvements. 
4 That was a verbal agreementf and was a 
5 contract only between Reed and Ferrin Whitaker. 
6 They're the two that talked about it. 
7 The contract has some of the same legal 
8 problems that the permissive easement has, i.e., 
9 it was not in writing at that time. So the Statute 
10 of Frauds would have come into play. I think too 
11 that there would be a problem in that contract, 
12 perhaps failing for want of consideration. The 
13 reason being, the original permission was given 
14 without limitation. And as I understand, once 
15 permission is granted and reliance is made and 
16 improvements are made, it becomes irrevocable. 
17 I find that the Kohlers did help maintain 
18 the lane in watering and mowing and just the 
19 general maintenance of their portion, inside I 
20 guess, of the lane, during the very early times. 
21 And that continued on until Mrs. Kohler, I think, 
22 probably became unable to do all of the work that 
23 she had done, although she continued to do what she 
24 could in watering. 
25 To the extent that the verbal contract and 
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1 later the written contract, which was presented to 
2 Elda Kohler by Mr. and Mrs. Whitaker which would 
3 have been sometime after, during or after April of 
4 1972, I find that Elda Kohler never agreed to the 
5 contract. She had knowledge of the verbal contract 
6 between her husband and the Whitakers and was not a 
7 party to that contract. And she never agreed to 
8 the terms and conditions set forth in the written 
9 agreement. To that extent, since April of '72 her 
10 use, and the use of the owners of the Kohler 
11 property, has been adverse to the Whitakers and 
12 their successors. 
13 And so notwithstanding my very early 
14 comments about adversing the government, the 
15 Kohlers would be entitled to a prescriptive 
16 easement over the same portion I've already 
17 indicated, the part that they've used up to and 
18 around the tree. 
19 (SKIP IN TAPE @ #3321). 
20 THE COURT: — Barretts. Excuse me. Is 
21 that the right name? 
22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKERS: Bassetts. 
23 THE COURT: Bassetts, excuse me. As to 
24 the Bassetts1 and the Martins' permissive use, I'm 
25 not sure you can change the status by saying okay, 
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1 we'll give you permission to use a right-of-way, or 
2 give one permission to do what they are already 
3 doing. I don't believe you can change the 
4 character of the fact that the Whitakers were 
5 seeking compensation for the easement, which 
6 compensation was never sought through legal 
7 proceedings. So even the verbal contract, had it 
8 been enforced in a timely manner, might have been 
9 enforced, but I think the Statute of Limitations 
10 have long run on that. And I find that the 
11 Whitakers waived any, any rights that they may have 
12 had to collect on that. 
13 I find that all of the successors of the 
14 Whitakers had knowledge of the lane and easement 
15 and use of the Kohlers. Just by the lay of the 
16 land it's apparent that that was the access that 
17 had been used over a long number of years. The 
18 direction the garage faces, the practicality. It's 
19 just very apparent that the knowledge of the use 
20 was there. And that even if they were mistaken in 
21 their understanding of whether or not that use was 
22 permissive, they would not be able to change the 
23 character of the prescriptive rights by later 
24 giving permission to do what plaintiffs and their 
25 predecessors were already doing. 
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1 As to the terms of the proposed contract, 
2 it provided upon the demise of Elda Kohler, or the 
3 sale of the home, that the right-of-way was to be 
4 purchased by its terms. And I find that the home 
5 was sold back in 1980 from Elda Kohler to Marden 
6 Kohler and Joy Kohler. So if that contract, 
7 assuming it had any affect, even at the date that 
8 that first term came into being, that no action was 
9 taken to enforce it at that time either; one of 
10 the conditions having then been met, the sale of 
11 the home. 
12 This is an unfortunate situation between 
13 neighbors and a purchaser of a home in an area, 
14 with an understanding that he has that this 
15 right-of-way is limited. And then when feelings 
16 and tempers flared, I think sometimes these 
17 feelings get in the way of calm and collective 
18 understanding and logic. 
19 I don't find any bad faith on the part of 
20 the defendant. I think because of those 
21 disagreements and misunderstandings between the 
22 neighbors that he's doing everything he feels he 
23 ought to do legally to protect his rights. His 
24 defenses are not without merit, without a sound, 
25 reasonable basis. And so I find no bad faith on 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 7tActJ 
1 || his part. 
2 || And I think we'll put to rest attorney's 
3 II fees being a part of the damages. They will not be 
4 insofar as the damages in the lawsuit. 
5 Now, I will reserve attorney's fees 
6 regarding the contempt question that is still 
7 pending before the Court. That being whether or 
8 not he violated an order of the Court, thereby 
9 necessitating the Order to Show Cause that came 
10 before the Court. And so we may need to carve out 
11 that portion of the attorney's fees if contempt is 
12 found. 
13 I find that because of these feelings that 
14 it would be appropriate to grant restraining 
15 orders, restraining both parties. And insofar as 
16 possible, even members of families who are 
17 nonparties to this action, from in anyway 
18 harassing, belittling, causing problems with each 
19 of the families respectively. 
20 The gate should be removed from its 
21 present location. If defendant desires to 
22 construct it up above the easement that I've 
23 granted, he's certainly free and welcome to do 
24 that. It would keep traffic that may come up that 
25 II roadway at least from continuing on up into his 
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1 residential, immediate residential area. 
2 The trash that I've heard about, I didn't 
3 really hear evidence that it's obstructing the use 
4 of the right-of-way. It is on property owned by 
5 the defendant. And while it may be unsightly and 
6 unneighborly, I don't find that it violates any 
7 rights or laws, nor does it interfere with the 
8 easement. 
9 (SKIP IN TAPE @ #4277) 
10 THE COURT: -- Whitakers never revoked any 
11 permissive use that they gave initially. I find 
12 that the use by the plaintiffs was open and 
13 visible. 
14 I find that the Bassetts never gave 
15 permission for the use, which is a further finding 
16 that supports that the use has been adverse. 
17 MR. FELTON: I'm sorry. I didn't hear 
18 you, Your Honor. I--
19 THE COURT: I said I find that Mr. Bassett 
20 never gave permission to use the right-of-way. 
21 Which again supports the adverse use by the 
22 plaintiffs. 
23 If I haven't already said it, the 
24 Whitakers' permission originally given was without 
25 restrictions. 
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1 MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS: You already voiced 
2 that one. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 I find there was no interruption in the 
5 use from and after the time that the plaintiffs 
6 became the owners of the property in 1980. 
7 I find too that Elda Kohler was away from 
8 the property at least nine months prior to her 
9 death and there was no interruption in the use of 
10 the right-of-way when she left. It was not 
11 restricted, the permission or the, I guess the use 
12 was not simply restricted to Elda's use, but it was 
13 the plaintiffs and their invitees and others were 
14 using it at that time. 
15 And again, I may have said this, but I've 
16 noted it twice so I'll say it again if I've already 
17 said it. That the attempt of the Whitakers to 
18 change the terms of their grant as presented both 
19 in the verbal agreement and in the later written 
20 agreement, I'm not sure that the terms are any 
21 different, but there were two different times that 
22 it was presented, once to Mr. Reed Kohler and later 
23 to Elda Kohler in the written form. To the extent 
24 that it attempted to change the terms, the use 
25 became adverse 
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1 II From the testimony of Martha Whitaker, she 
2 indicated because Elda couldn't handle it they 
3 backed off. And I think by doing that they waived 
4 the collection and demand and eviction, or whatever 
5 else they might have done. Her words were "we 
6 forgot about it". 
7 I find too that even the Whitakers were 
8 surprised when they purchased the property to 
9 learn, after they called for a survey, that the 
10 road was on their land. Up until then even they 
11 thought it was a public way. 
12 While I agree with the statement that a 
13 payment of $933.44 would have been a much more 
14 economical way to handle this some years ago, it's 
15 not relevant to the respective rights of the 
16 parties. I don't know if you want to include that 
17 in the finding, but that's an observation I make. 
18 Those findings I can make now. But I do 
19 feel like more enlightenment might be needed. As 
20 is apparent, I've avoided the promissory estoppel 
21 because you've got it by prescription, and you've 
22 got the public thoroughfare. 
23 MR. FELTON: Your Honor, might it be 
24 appropriate to have the findings prepared, and then 
25 when I file my objection we can deal with them? I 
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1 || mean, that might be the appropriate way. Once 
2 || they're prepared then we can deal with your 
3 II findings in light of my objections and various 
4 post-trial requests. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. 
6 MR. FELTON: Is that acceptable? 
7 MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS: Yes, it's acceptable. 
8 MR. FELTON: I think that's — 
9 MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS: It makes good sense. 
10 That way if you want to cite case authority or 
11 anything else in support of your objections, the 
12 promissory estoppel issue, you can do so. 
13 THE COURT: Yes. 
14 MR. A. DEAN JEFFS: Your Honor, I do have 
15 one, two questions. One is you said that the 
16 driveway extends up to the tree. The description 
17 that was presented goes up past the tree to the 
18 north side of the driveway, since the driveway has 
19 two sides that go around the tree, one on the right 
20 and — 
21 THE COURT: When I meant around the tree. 
22 There's a Y up there and I would put it to the top 
23 of the Y. Is that what the description names? 
24 MR. A. DEAN JEFFS: Yes (inaudible). 
25 MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS: Yes. That's correct, 
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1 Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: For purposes of the findings 
3 I'll adopt that description. That's the lower 
4 portion. And again, not giving any fee title, but 
5 only the right to use that. And I guess I'd like 
6 to get away from granting the public the right to 
7 use that, although I think the evidence shows clear 
8 and convincing evidence that it was established. 
9 And definitely the Kohlers have the prescriptive 
10 right to use it, as I've indicated. 
11 MR. FELTON: Your Honor, I don't know if 
12 this is the appropriate time, but since there is a 
13 finding that there is an easement I think it would 
14 be appropriate for the Court to address the 
15 maintenance issue. I do believe if we have 
16 co-tenants on an easement, that future maintenance 
17 costs should be shared. 
18 THE COURT: They should. And I would make 
19 that a finding that they ought to be shared and 
20 that it ought to be maintained at, at least the 
21 level that it's been maintained over the years. So 
22 if it's going to need resurfacing, etcetera, those 
23 costs should be shared on that portion. 
24 MR. A. DEAN JEFFS: I think that would be 
25 fine, Your Honor. But the decision as to what 
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DECL.\IL\T10S OF RIGHTS 
-VOTES TO DECISIOSS 
Art I. $ 22 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
Withholding tax. 
In general. 
No man can have a vested interest in the 
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to 
insist that another work for him, since that 
would violate this section. McGrew v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938). 
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
This section prohibits the appointment of a 
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's 
estate if that person refuses to consent to such 
appointment. In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d 
128 (Utah 1978). 
Withholding tax. 
Provision requiring that a city withhold 
state income taxes due from employees does 
not subject the city to involuntary servitude. 
Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur . 2d Involuntary 
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S. 
Slaves § 10. 
Key Numbers. — Slaves «=» 24. 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
History: Const. 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Advance payment of compensation. 
Airplane overflights. 
Closing street. 
Consequential damages. 
—Railroad. 
—Road construction. 
—School construction. 
Defense to condemnation proceeding. 
Elements of taking or damage. 
Fair market value. 
Section self-executing. 
Highway easement. 
Intangible factors. 
Interest in condemnation proceedings. 
Inverse condemnation. 
Just compensation. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Removal of personal property. 
Services of attorney in defending indigent. 
Statute of limitations. 
Taxes. 
Water rights. 
Cited. 
Advance payment of compensation. 
This section provides merely that the prop-
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation, and does not 
require compensation to be paid in advance. 
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 
503 P.2d 144 (1972). 
Airplane overflights. 
For discussion of taking issues in an action 
by landowners alleging that their land has 
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 
1986). 
Closing street. 
Where city, without notice, petition, or hear-
ing, closes a portion of a street and alley abut-
ting on school board-owned property on both 
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus 
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned prop-
erty, there has been a taking requiring just 
compensation. Boskovich v. Midvale City 
Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952). 
Closing of city street and alleged impair-
ment of access to commercial properties was 
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the mean-
ing of this section; the alleged damages re-
sulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence 
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably 
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57 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 19 
a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first 
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equity. 
Auto accident. 
Same transaction. 
—Unrelated claims by assignee. 
Joinder of remedies. 
—Insurer and tort-feasor. 
Cited. 
Joinder of claims. 
—Tort, contract and equi ty . 
Auto accident. 
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an 
auto accident filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion seeking to void insurance policy due to 
misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in 
the policy application, and one of the defen-
dants in the declaratory judgment action coun-
terclaimed against the insurer and cross-
claimed in tort against the other defendants, in 
determining whether to dismiss the defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit 
their joinder, the trial court should have per-
mitted the joinder unless the insurer could 
show that it would be prejudiced because of 
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed; 
trial court should not have dismissed defen-
dant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis 
that joinder was of both tort and contract ac-
tions. Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d 
737 (Utah 1982). 
Same t r ansac t ion . 
All issues, whether in contract, tort, law or 
equity, arising out of a transaction between 
two parties, may be pleaded and proved in a 
single action. Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 
369 P.2d 933 (1962). 
—Unrelated claims by assignee. 
Where seven different claimants assigned 
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for 
purpose of collecting on them from a single de-
fendant, and each cause of action arose from 
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of 
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff 
was not permitted to join all of the claims 
against defendant in one action despite the 
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could 
not have joined together and asserted their 
various claims in one action against defendant 
(Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess 
any greater rights than those possessed by his 
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 
P.2d 964 (1965). 
Joinder of remedies. 
—Insurer and tort-feasor. 
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur-
ance company as a party defendant in a per-
sonal injury action, based on insurance policy 
providing that the insurance company "has 
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim 
has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not 
come within the joinder provision of either 
Subdivision (b) or Rule 20. Young v. Barney, 
20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
Because there is no reason to believe the new 
rules were intended to change prior practice of 
not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance 
coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of 
tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist 
insurer is improper. Christensen v. Peterson, 
25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971). 
Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 
351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
et seq. 
1 Am. Jur . 2d Actions § 81 C.J .S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101. 
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 39 to 60. 
Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication. 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of 
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the 
subject mat ter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If 
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he 
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, 
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue 
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be 
dismissed from the action. A 
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(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person 
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court 
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should 
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the 
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's ab-
sence might be prejudicia) to him or those already parties; second, the extent 
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether 
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-
joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for 
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as de-
scribed in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons 
why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 19, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Discretion of court. 
Indispensable parties. 
—Failure to join. 
Assertion for first time at trial. 
Assertion for first time on appeal. 
Dismissal not bar to action on merits. 
—Partner in joint venture. 
—Two-part inquiry. 
Joinder not required. 
Necessary parties. 
—Corporate stock transfers. 
—Definition. 
—Denial of joinder. 
—Failure to intervene. 
Effect upon subsequent suit. 
—Failure to join. 
—Involuntary plaintiff. 
Relationship or interest. 
—Joinder not required. 
—Purpose of rule. 
Cited. 
Discretion of court. 
Ordinarily, a trial court's determination 
properly entered under this rule will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Seftel 
v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v. Capital 
City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
Indispensable parties. 
—Failure to join. 
Trial court abused its discretion in dismiss-
ing an action with prejudice for failure to join 
indispensable parties, and not allowing an 
amendment or granting a continuance, where 
defendant claimed no surprise but merely re-
lied on the likelihood of increased costs and 
complexity if the amendment were granted. In-
termountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Mi-
cro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Assertion for first time at trial. 
Under Rule 12(h), defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party asserted for first time 
at trial was to be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in light of any evidence received; 
thus where defendants in action to enforce re-
strictive covenant did not adduce evidence suf-
ficient to establish and identify an interest on 
part of the alleged "indispensable party," so as 
to require joinder, it was proper to refuse to 
dismiss action. Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 
1256 (Utah 1975). 
——Assertion for first time on appeal. 
A party may raise the issue of failure to join 
an indispensable party at any time in the pro-
ceedings, including for the first time on appeal. 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v. 
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). 
Dismissal not bar to action on merits. 
Dismissal for failure to join an indispensable 
party is only an abatement of that particular 
action and does not bar an action on the merits. 
Thus, while dismissal on such ground may be 
proper, dismissal with prejudice would be an 
abuse of discretion, since the rules of procedure 
are intended to encourage the adjudication of 
disputes on their merits. Bonneville Tower 
Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson 
Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986). 
—-Partner in jo in t ven tu re . 
Where a partner in a joint venture sued po-
tential investors in the venture for interfer-
ence with contract, interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage, and breach of agree-
ment, the partner was required to either name 
the partnership as party in interest or join his 
partner as an indispensable party in interest. 
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). 
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Co. v. United States, 9 Utah 2d 428, 347 P.2d State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Toledo, 699 P.2d 
184 (1959); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 710 (Utah 1985); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 
614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. Utah 1024 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur . 2d Parties § 92 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that when 
et seq. person who should join as plaintiff refuses to do 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 17 to 29, 30 to so, he may be made involuntary plaintiff "in a 
32, 41 to 50. proper case," 20 A.L.R. Fed. 193. 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "proper case" Key Numbers. — Parties «= 13 to 20 V2, 24 
within meaning of provision of Rule 19(a) of to 35. 
Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties. 
(a) Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if 
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in re-
spect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them 
will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants 
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any 
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, 
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need 
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. 
Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their 
respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to 
their respective liabilities. 
(b) Separate trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a 
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a 
party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against 
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or 
prejudice. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is substan- Cross-References . — Separate trial autho-
tially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P. rized, U.R.C.P. 42(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS CO. V. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 
, (1957). 
n ® u r e r - —Persona l injury act ion. 
-Dec la ra to ry action as to effect of policy. Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur-
—Personal injury action.
 a n c e c o m p a n y a s a p a r t y defendant in a per-
Cited. sonal injury action, based on insurance policy 
Insurer. providing that the insurance company "has 
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim 
—Declara tory ac t ion as to effect of policy.
 h a 8 D e e n p r 0secuted to a conclusion," did not 
One who claims to be damaged by the negli-
 c o m e within the joinder provision of either 
gent act of another is not a proper party to an Rule 18(b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20 
action by the insurer of the latter under a pub- Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
lie liability policy, whereby a declaratory judg- Cited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 
ment is sought declaring the legal effect of the P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur . 2d Parties § 92 Key N u m b e r s . — Parties *= 13 to 16, 24 to 
et seq.; 75 Am. Jur . 2d Trial § 12. 27; Trial «=• 3, 4. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 33 to 55; 88 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 7 to 10. 
25-5-3 FRAUD 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2462; 
C.L. 1917, § 5812; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-
5-2. 
ANALYSIS 
Constructive trust. 
Trusts. 
—Evidence. 
Wills. 
Constructive trust. 
Equity imposes a constructive trust to pre-
vent one from unjustly profiting through fraud 
or the violation of a duty imposed under a 
fiduciary or confidential relationship. Hawkins 
v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953). 
After defendant altered a certificate of sale of 
land by inserting his own name as purchaser, so 
that the land was not included in the decedent's 
estate, there was a constructive trust for the 
benefit of the decedent's heirs, and the estate 
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah 
2d 189, 264 P.2d 852 (1953). 
Constructive trust to prevent unjust enrich-
ment is not within the statute of frauds. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 
1977). 
Trusts. 
Trusts arising by implication or operation of 
law are expressly excluded from the effects of 
the statute; and a deed of conveyance, though 
absolute in form, if given to secure a debt, is in 
equity treated as a mortgage — a trust by 
operation of law. Wasatch Mining Co. v. 
Jennings, 5 Utah 243, 15 P. 65 (1887). 
Where defendant verbally agreed with the 
owner of real estate which was subject to a 
mortgage to bid the property in at foreclosure 
sale, and to convey title to plaintiff for a sum 
certain after he obtained the sheriff's deed, and 
plaintiff relied on such agreement and paid the 
specified amount to defendant who asserted 
ownership to the property and refused to con-
vey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio arose, 
and was enforceable though the contract was 
His to ry : R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463; 
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-
5-3. 
not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 
95 P. 527 (1908). 
A deed given to secure a debt, though abso-
lute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so that 
a t rust was created by operation of law and, 
under the express language of this section, was 
not prevented by § 25-5-1. Taylor v. Turner, 27 
Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972). 
—Evidence . 
One seeking to have rights declared and 
enforced, founded upon or growing out of trust 
or a confidential relation, is required to show, 
with at least reasonable certainty, the terms of 
agreement and the character and extent of the 
trust or confidential relation. Coray v. 
Holbrook, 40 Utah 325, 121 P. 572 (1912). 
Parol evidence is admissible to show a trust 
relationship by operation of law. Barrett v. 
Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P2d 772 (1941). 
In an action to impress a trust upon real 
property, evidence supported a finding that 
grantor's daughter took the property by war-
ranty deed subject to "oral trust" whereby 
daughter was to maintain the property as a 
family home to be used by grantor and her 
children and grandchildren for as long as any of 
said persons needed a home, with complete 
discretion in the daughter as to the time and as 
to which of said persons should use property. 
Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P2d 229 
(1949). 
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove a 
constructive trust or resulting trust since they 
arise by operation of law and are expressly 
excluded from the statute of frauds by this 
section. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982). 
Wills. 
When a will is sought to be maintained also 
as a contract, it must satisfy this and succeed-
ing sections of the statute of frauds. Ward v. 
Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938). 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the 
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized in writing. 
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(i) the permission shall contain the condition tha t any instal-
lation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the 
city or town; and 
(ii) the city or town shall cause any installation to be removed 
at the request of the department when the department finds the 
removal necessary-
(A) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety; 
(B) for the construction and maintenance of the state 
highway; or 
(C) to meet the requirements of federal regulations. 
(3) If it is necessary that a utility, as defined in Section 27-12-11, be 
relocated on federal-aid highways, reimbursement shall be made for the 
relocation as provided for in Section 27-12-11. 
(4) (a) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on 
the state highways when it is found necessary by the department for 
the proper control of traffic, driveway entrances, or drainage. 
(b) If a state highway is widened or altered and existing curbs, 
gutters, and sidewalks are removed, the department shall replace the 
curbs, gutters, and sidewalks. 
(5) The department may furnish and install street lighting systems for 
the state highways, but their operation and maintenance is the responsi-
bility of the city or town. 
(6) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and 
maintenance of the state highways, the cost of the storm sewer facilities 
shall be borne by the state and the city or town in a proportion mutually 
agreed upon between the department and the highway authorities of the 
city or town. 
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules governing the location 
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering the state 
highway, and the department may delegate the administration of the rules 
to the highway authorities of the city or town. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 88; 1991, ch. The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
137, § 21; 1994, ch. 120, § 36. substituted "for highways" for "with respect to 
A m e n d m e n t No te s . — The 1991 amend streets" in the introductory language, subdi-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, redivided Sub- vided Subsection (2), substituted "department" 
section (1) into present Subsections (1) to i3), for "commission" in Subsections (6) and (7), 
redesignated former Subsections (2) to (5) as added the code citation in Subsection (7); and 
present Subsections (3) to (7), substituted "de- made stylistic changes 
partment" for "state road commission" through-
out the section, and made changes in punctua-
tion and phraseology 
ARTICLE 6 
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY 
PURPOSES 
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication. 
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for 
a period of ten years. 
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-13 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig-
nated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate, in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-13. 
Cross-References. — Dedication of streets, 
§ 57-5 4 
Disposal of unused rights of way *J 27 12 97 
Highways continue until abandoned 
* 27 12 90 
Vacation of highways § 27-12 102 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Establishment of a holding by city 
—Insufficient 
Establishment of a holding by drainage dis-
trict 
Estoppel 
—Affirmative acts 
— Denied 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
— Insufficient 
The citv must have some semblance of title 
possession or right to use, and making a sur 
vey, destruction of a fence between the street 
and adjoining property, and verbal assertion of 
ownership by the city are not sufficient to es 
tabhsh a holding Gibbons v Salt Lake City 
Corp, 6 Utah 2d 219, 310 P 2d 513 (1957) 
Establishment of a holding by drainage 
district. 
The evidence indicated that land held by the 
Utah County Drainage District Number 1 was 
for pubhc use and therefore could not be ac 
quired by adverse possession Averett v Utah 
County Drainage Dist No 1, 763 P 2d 428 
(Utah Ct App 1988) 
Estoppel. 
— Affirmative acts. 
There is no bar of the statute of limitations 
against a city, in respect to a pubhc street 
within its boundaries the city may however 
be estopped by its affirmative acts to claim 
land as part of a street Wall v Salt Lake City, 
50 Utah 593 168 P 766 (1917) 
— Denied. 
Where city quitclaimed alley to private 
party in contravention of statute for small con 
sideration, and there was no evidence that 
property ever was assessed against grantee or 
his successors in interest and time element 
was short and there was no replatting or 
change in whole neighborhood to benefit of all 
adjacent landowners there was no ground for 
estoppel in pais as against city s right to quiet 
title as against parties holding under grantee 
of quitclaim deed Tooele City v Elkmgton, 
100 Utah 485 116 P 2d 406 (1941) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am J u r 2d Adverse Pos-
session ^ 268 269 
C.J.S. — 2 C J S Adverse Possession § 14 
Key Numbers 
8(1), (2) 
Adverse Possession «=» 
237 
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57-3-3 REAL ESTATE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am Ju r 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 98 
C.e).S. — 92 C d S Vendor and Purchaser 
§ 324 
A.L.R. — Recorded real property instrument 
as charging third party with constructive notice 
of provisions of extrinsic instrument referred to 
therein, 89 A L R 3d 901 
Key Numbers . — Vendor and Purchaser *$=> 
231(1) 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, ^ 2001; 
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
3-3; L. 1988, ch. 155, § 15; 1989, ch. 88, ^ 9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of failure to record 
Mortgage 
Obligation of grantor 
Priorities 
—Description of property insufficient 
— Prior unrecorded conveyance 
Cited 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where, after mortgage was executed on cer-
tain tract of land, owner executed deed to 
grantee on property not included in mortgage, 
which deed was not recorded, decree in action 
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, including 
part conveyed to grantee was not binding on 
grantee who was not party to such action 
Federal Land Bank v Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 
P2d 480, 102 A L R 819 (1935) 
Ajudgment hen is subordinate and inferior to 
a deed which predated it whether recorded 
after such judgment or whether not recorded at 
all Kartchner v State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d 
382, 294 P2d 790 (1956), Garland v 
Fleischmann, 831 P2d 107 (Utah 1992) 
Mortgage. 
This section applies to mortgage hens, mort-
gagee is purchaser, and law of priority of record 
applies to mortgages Federal Land Bank v 
Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P 2d 480, 102 A L R 819 
(1935) 
Obligation of grantor. 
The grantor of property has no implied obli-
gation to protect the grantee s rights by record-
ing the grantees interest in the piopeity or by 
informing third parties of the existence of the 
interest If the grantee fails to record, he as-
sumes the risk of a subsequent grantee of the 
same land acquiring superior rights to his by 
recordation Horman v Clark, 744 P2d 1014 
(Utah Ct App 1987) 
Priori t ies . 
—pescr ip t ion of property insufficient. 
Although defendant's deed was recorded 
first, failure of deed to adequately descnbe 
disputed portion of land resulted in omission of 
that portion from the deed, so that plaintiff's 
later-recorded deed, which included the dis-
puted property, voided defendant's claim to the 
property Neeley v Kelsch, 600 P2d 979 (Utah 
1979) 
—Prior unrecorded conveyance . 
Innocent purchaser for value without notice 
of previous conveyance, who first records his 
convejance, takes preference over prior unre-
corded conveyance McGarry v Thompson, 114 
Utah 442, 201 P2d 288 (1948) 
Later in time but prior recorded first mort-
gage took precedence over purchase money 
mortgage where mortgagee had no notice of the 
purchase money mortgage Kemp v Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288, 470 P2d 390 
(1970) 
Where buyers did not record their own con-
veyance, or contract, they did not obtain the 
statutory protection enjoyed by subsequent 
pu*chas«.rs vrv good fo\th s^d for vaius, agaAO&t 
unrecorded interests Gregerson v Jensen, 669 
P2d 396 (Utah 1983) 
Cited in Billings v Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd (In 
re Granada, Inc ), 92 Bankr 501 (Bankr D 
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MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 57-9-4 
(3) The rights of any person arising from prescriptive use or a period of 
adverse possession or user, which was in whole or in part subsequent to 
the effective date of the root of title 
(4) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been 
recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from which the 
unbroken chain of title of record is started, provided, however, that such 
recording shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has been 
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation of Section 
57-9-3 
(5) The exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to rights of reversioners 
in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of 
easements, and as to interests of the United States 
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS nonpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of 
title prior to the enactment of the statute re-
Adverse possession quiring payment of taxes as a condition of 
Boundary by acquiescence obtaining the title to land State ex rel Rd 
Adverse possession. £ ™ v C o x C o r P • 2 9 U t a h 2 d 1 2 7 5 0 6 P 2 d 
Citys continuous possession and use of canal 
for over ninety years and use of the land on Boundary bv acquiescence. 
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the This chapter did not apply to defeat funda 
canal established title in such land by adverse mental doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
possession possession was hostile in that it established in the defendants in a quiet title 
was of such character that ownership could be action Olsen v Park Daughters Inv Co , 29 
inferred therefrom, city acquired title despite Utah 2d 421 511 P2d 145 (1973) 
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of 
interests, claims and charges. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 57-9-2, the marketable record title shall 
be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land 
free and clear of all interests, claims or charges, whatsoever, the existence of 
which depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior 
to the effective date of the root of title All such interests, claims or charges, 
however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether 
such interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or under a 
disability, whether such person is within or without the state, whether such 
person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby 
declared to be void 
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 3. 
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized — 
Effect of possession of land by record owner of 
possessory interest. 
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective 
such interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately 
following the effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title 
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would otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, 
setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any 
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the runmng of the forty-year period. 
The notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting 
in behalf of any claimant who is 
(a) under a disability, 
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or 
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is 
uncertain at the time of filing the notice of claim for record. 
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in 
possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during 
which period no title transaction with respect to such interest appears of 
record in his chain of title, and no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf 
as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession continues to the time when 
marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall be deemed 
equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of 
the forty-year period descnbed in Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS nonpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of 
title prior to the enactment of the statute re-
Adverse possession. quiring payment of taxes as a condition of 
Boundary by acquiescence obtaining the title to land. State ex rel. Rd. 
Commn v Cox Corp , 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 P2d 
54(1973). Adverse possess ion. City's continuous possession and use of canal 
for over ninety years and use of the land on B o u n d a r y by a c q u i e s c e n c e . 
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the This chapter did not apply to defeat funda-
canal established title in such land by adverse mental doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
possession, possession was hostile in that it established in the defendants in a quiet title 
was of such a character that ownership could be action Olsen v Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 
inferred therefrom; city acquired title despite Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Slander of title, sufficiency of plain-
tiff's interest in real property to maintain ac-
tion, 86 A.L R 4th 738 
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest — Contents — Filing for 
record. 
To be effective and to be entitled to record, the notice referred to above shall 
contain an accurate and full description of all land affected by such notice 
which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not by general 
inclusions; but if the claim is founded upon a recorded instrument, then the 
description in the notice may be the same as that contained in the recorded 
instrument. The notice shall be filed for record in the registry of deeds of the 
county or counties where the land described therein is situated. The recorder 
of each county shall accept all such notices presented to him which describe 
land located in the county in which he serves and shall enter and record full 
copies thereof in the same way that deeds and other instruments are recorded 
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27-12-1 HIGHWAYS 
Section 
27-12-137.6. Conditions for licensing of 
junkyard within 1,000 feet of 
highway. 
27-12-137.7 Screening of existing junkyards. 
27-12-137.8. Repealed. 
27-12-137.9. Junkyards not adaptable to 
screening — Authority of de-
partment to acquire land — 
Compensation. 
27-12-137.10. Junkyard operated in violation 
of provisions is public nui-
sance — Abatement — Cor-
rection notice. 
27-12-137.11. Enforcement authority — 
Agreements with United 
States. 
27-12-137.12. Present ordinances or regula-
tions saved. 
27-12-137.13. Violations — Misdemeanor. 
27-12-138. Obstructing traffic on sidewalks 
or highways prohibited. 
27-12-138.5. Gates on B system county high-
ways. 
27-12-139. Driving animals over highways 
— Liability for damages. 
27-12-140. Limited highways — Penalty 
for driving animals over. 
27-12-141. Escaping water and other ob-
structions — Injuring or ob-
structing highway — Penalty 
for violations. 
27-12-142. Injury to trees on highways — 
Penalty for violations. 
27-12-143. Violations of rules as to use — 
Damage to signs, warnings, 
or barriers — Penalty. 
27-12-144. Liability for damage to highway, 
highway equipment, or high-
way sign — Liability for dam-
age to highway from illegal 
operation or oversize or over-
weight vehicles — Recovery. 
Section 
27-12-145. Highway authority — Restric-
tions on highway use — Erec-
tion and maintenance of signs 
designating restrictions — 
Penalty. 
27-12-146. Loads on vehicles — Confining, 
securing, and fastening load 
required — Penalty. 
27-12-147. Repealed. 
27-12-148. Application of size, weight, and 
load limitations for vehicles 
— Exceptions. 
27-12-149. Limitations as to vehicle width, 
height, length, and load ex-
tensions. 
27-12-150. Towing requirements and limi-
tations on towing. 
27-12-151. Maximum gross weight limita-
tion for vehicles — Bridge for-
mula for weight limitations — 
Minimum mandatory fines. 
27-12-152. Repealed. 
27-12-153. Measuring vehicles for size and 
weight compliance — Sum-
mary powers of peace officers 
— Penalty for violations. 
27-12-154. Oversize permits and oversize 
and overweight permits for 
vehicles of excessive size or 
weight — Applications — Re-
strictions — Fees — Rule-
making provisions — Penalty. 
27-12-155 to 27-12-157. Repealed. 
Article 13 
Establ ishment of Specific Highways 
27-12-158, 27-12-159. Repealed. 
27-12-160. 1-15 designated as Veterans' 
Memorial Highway. 
27-12-161. Legacy Loop Highway. 
ARTICLE 1 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND DEFINITIONS 
27-12-1. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Section 27-12-1 (L. 1963, ch. 39, 
§ 1), the legislative declaration of intent, was 
repealed by Laws 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 53. 
27-12-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commission" means 
under Section 63-49-10. 
the Transportation Commission appointed 
274 
043 
HIGHWAY CODE 27-12-2 
(2) "Construction" means the construction, reconstruction, replace-
ment, and improvement of the highways, including the acquisition of 
rights-of-way and material sites. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Transportation created in 
Section 63-49-4. 
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department 
appointed under Section 63-49-5. 
(5) "Farm tractor" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102. 
(6) "Highway" means any public road, street, alley, lane, court, place, 
viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or structure laid out or erected for public 
use, or dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in an action 
for the partition of real property, including the entire area within the 
right-of-way. 
(7) "Highway authority" means the department or the legislative, 
executive, or governing body of a county, city, or town. 
(8) "Implement of husbandry" has the meaning set forth in Section 
41-la-102. 
(9) "Limited-access facility" means a highway especially designated for 
through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants 
of abutting lands nor other persons have any right or easement, or have 
only a limited right or easement of access, light, air, or view. 
(10) (a) "Port-of-entry" means a fixed or temporary facility constructed, 
operated, and maintained by the department where drivers, vehicles, 
and vehicle loads are checked or inspected for compliance with state 
and federal laws as specified in Section 27-12-19 
(b) "Port-of-entry" includes inspection and checking stations and 
weigh stations. 
(11) "Port-of-entry agent" means a person employed at a port-of-entry to 
perform the duties specified in Section 27-12-19. 
(12) "Right-of-way" means real property or an interest in real property, 
usually in a strip, acquired for or devoted to a highway. 
(13) "Semitrailer" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-1 a-102. 
(14) "State highway" means those highways designated as state high-
ways in Title 27, Chapter 12, Article 4, Designation of State Highways, 
and under Section 27-12-27. 
(15) "State highway purposes" has the meaning set forth in Section 
27-12-96. 
(16) "Trailer" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102. 
(17) "Truck tractor" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102. 
(18) "UDOT" means the Utah Department of Transportation. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 2; 1975 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 9, § 4; 1990, ch. 88, § 1; 1991, ch. 
137, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 3; 1994, ch . 7, § 1; 
1994, ch. 11, § 1; 1994, ch. 120, § 29. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, rewrote Subsec-
tion (1), which read "'Commission,' 'state road 
commission,' or 'highway department ' means 
the appropriate division, office, commission, or 
committee in the Utah Department of Trans-
portation", added Subsections (3), (4) and (13), 
redesignated former Subsections (3) to (10) as 
Subsections (5) to (12) and Subsections (11) to 
(13) as Subsections 114) to (16); deleted "of 
Transportation" after 'depaitment" and substi-
tuted "commission" for "Utah Transportation 
Commission" and "or" for "and" before "govern-
ing body" in Subsection (7), substituted "Imple-
ment" for "Implements" at the beginning of 
Subsection (8), and substituted "real propeity 
or an interest in real property" for "land, prop-
erty, or an interest therein" in Subsection (11) 
The 1992 amendment, effective January 30, 
1992, substituted the present code citation in 
Subsections (5), (8), (12), U5), and (16) for 
"Section 41 1 1" and made stylistic changes 
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fare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 
P.2d 545 (1968). 
Rights granted to public. 
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under 
Tbwnsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq., now 
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as 
public street, so that only right that public 
could have acquired would be nght to easement 
across strip for traveling purposes, and only 
additional right contiguous property owners 
might acquire would be right of ingress to and 
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v. 
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947). 
Rights of subsequent grantees . 
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway 
and is accepted by public as such, all subse-
quent grantees of abutting lands are bound by 
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 
P. 955 (1901). 
Sufficiency of proof of dedicat ion. 
Highway over privately owned ground will be 
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public 
use when the public has continuously used it as 
a thoroughfare for a period often years. Morris 
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
Mere use by public of private alley in common 
with owners of alley does not show a dedication 
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public 
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340, 
273 P.2d 720 (1954). 
Though dedication of one's land to public use 
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow, 
private dead-end street was used by neighbor-
ing residents and the general public without 
interference for at least 25 years, and where the 
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and 
had thereafter paved it and maintained a pub-
lic street sign at its entrance, and where plain-
tiff who owned the fee simple interest in the 
land on which the street was situated had not 
paid any taxes on the street property for 25 
years, this combination of factors was sufficient 
to justify finding that the street had been 
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 
Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966). 
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of 
proof is required for the establishment of a 
public thoroughfare or taking of another's prop-
erty. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 
P.2d 639 (1972). 
Where the trial court found that public had 
used north-south road for 12 years and that 
during this time, the road was ten feet wide, 
and the court found that there was insufficient 
use of an east-west road by the public to make 
it a public road, these findings of fact, sup-
ported by substantial evidence, compelled a 
holding that the north-south road was a public 
highway ten feet wide and that no public high-
way existed on the east-west road. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jack-
son Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
For cases finding sufficient evidence to sup-
port finding of dedication to public use, see 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 
2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959). 
"Thoroughfare" and "public thorough-
fare" dist inguished. 
Under identically worded predecessor sec-
tion, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way 
through which there is passing or travel. It 
became a "public thoroughfare" when the public 
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v. 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges § 25 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Highways <s=» 6(1). 
27-12-90, Highways once established continue until aban-
doned. 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction 
over any such highway, or by other competent authority. 
His tory : L. 1963, ch . 39, § 90. 
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27-12-22. County roads — Class B roads — Construction 
and maintenance by counties — Levy. 
(1) County roads comprise all public roads and streets within the state: 
(a) not designated as state highways that are situated outside of 
incorporated municipalities; 
(b) that have been designated as county roads; and 
(c) those public roads located within a national forest and constructed 
or maintained by the county under agreement with the appropriate 
federal agency. 
(2) County roads are class B roads. 
(3) County roads are under the jurisdiction and control of the county 
governing bodies of the respective counties and shall be constructed and 
maintained by or under the authority of the county governing bodies of the 
respective counties from funds made available for that purpose. 
(4) The county legislative body has authority to expend or by contract cause 
to be expended the funds allocated to each county from the Transportation 
Fund under rules made by the department. 
(5) When the county legislative body considers the funds available for 
county road purposes from sources other than the levy made against tangible 
property adequate to properly construct and maintain the class B roads, the 
county may: 
(a) cease making a levy for county road purposes; or 
(b) use any portion of the class B road funds provided by this chapter for 
the construction and maintenance of class A state roads by cooperative 
agreement with the department. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 22; 1967, ch. 50, "county governing body" in Subsection (5) 
§ 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 13; 1993, ch. 227, § 296; The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
1994, ch. 120, ^ 31. substituted "municipalities" for "cities and 
Amendment Notes . — The 1991 amend- towns" in Subsection (l)(a), in Subsection (4), 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted substituted "legislative body" for "governing 
"county governing body" and "county governing bodies" and "department" for "commission", 
bodies" for "county commissioners" throughout subdivided Subsection (5), and made stylistic 
the section; substituted "department" for "state changes 
road commission" at the end of the section, and Cross-References. — Counties, power to 
otherwise rewrote the section to such an extent levy taxes, § 17-5-248 
that a detailed analysis is impracticable General powers of counties, Title 17, Chapter 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, 4 
substituted "county legislative body" for Special road districts, § 17A-3-1201 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in J B Ranch, Inc v Grand County, 
958 F2d 306 (10th Cir 1992) 
27-12-23. City streets — Class C roads — Construction 
and maintenance — Use of levy. 
(1) City streets comprise* 
(a) highways within the corporate limits of the municipalities that are 
not designated as class A state roads or as class B roads; and 
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(b) those highways located within a national forest and constructed or 
maintained by the municipality under agreement with the appropriate 
federal agency. 
(2) City streets are under the jurisdiction and control of the governing 
officials of the municipality. 
(3) City streets are class C roads. 
(4) The department shall cooperate with the municipal legislative body in 
the construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each municipal-
ity, and the municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be expended 
upon the class C roads the amount allocated to each municipality from the 
Transportation Fund under rules made by the department. 
(5) Any town or city in the third class may: 
(a) contract with the county or the department for the construction and 
maintenance of class C roads within its corporate limits; or 
(b) transfer, with the consent of the county, its: 
(i) class C roads to the class B road system; and 
(ii) funds allocated from the Transportation Fund to the municipal-
ity to the county legislative body for use upon the class C roads. 
(6) When the municipal legislative body of any municipality of the third 
class considers the funds available for road purposes from sources other than 
the levy made against tangible property adequate to properly construct and 
maintain the class C roads within any municipality, the municipal legislative 
body may use any portion of the class C road funds allocated to the munici-
pality for the construction of sidewalks, curbs, and gutters on class A state 
roads within the municipal limits by cooperative agreement with the depart-
ment. 
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 23; 1969, ch. 67, the state road commission" in Subsection (5)(b); 
§ 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 14; 1993, ch. 227, § 297; and made changes in phraseology. 
1994, ch. 120, § 32. The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, 
Amendment Notes . — The 1991 amend- deleted "governing body" after "county" in Sub-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the sections (5)(a) and (b) and substituted "county 
section; substituted "department" for "state legislative body" for "county governing body" in 
road commission" and "county governing body" Subsection (5)(b). 
for "county commissioners" where the refer- The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
ences appear; substituted "City streets" for "All substituted "municipality" and "municipalities" 
public roads or streets" at the beginning of for the various singular and plural forms of 
Subsection (1); substituted "highways" for "pub- "city and town" throughout; substituted "mu-
lic roads" in Subsection (1Kb); substituted nicipal legislative body" for "governing officials 
"Transportation Fund" for "state road fund" in of cities and towns" and "governing officials" 
Subsections (4) and (5)(b); substituted "made by throughout; substituted "department" for "com-
the commission" for "and regulations mutually mission" at the end of Subsection (4); and made 
adopted by the city officials and the state road stylistic changes. 
commission" in Subsection (4) and for "mutu- Cross-References. — Powers of cities, Title 
ally adopted by the county commissioners and 10, Chapter 8. 
27-12-23.5. Jurisdiction over highways leading to and 
within state parks. 
(1) The department, a county, or a city has jurisdiction over and responsi-
bility for: 
(a) primary access highways to state parks; 
(b) highways to the main attraction within each state park; and 
(c) highways through state parks providing access to land uses beyond 
state park boundaries. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Farmers New 141 (Utah 1990). 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving prop-
erty. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery 
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title 
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any 
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or 
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 6. Quiet title actions, * 78-40-1 et seq. 
Cross-References. — Mortgage foreclosure 
actions, § 78-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS only as clearly expressed therein Holt v Utah 
State Rd Comm , 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P 2d 1286 
Construction and application. (1973). 
Scope of section. 
Scope of section. 
Construction and application. This section waives immunity only for ac-
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the tions to recover property, quiet title, clear title, 
recovery of any property real or personal or for or resolve disputes over mortgages or liens 
the possession thereof does not include an ac- held by a governmental entity; a claim alleg-
tion for damages for impairment of access to ing damage or destruction of private property 
property caused by construction of highway by a governmental entity does not fall within 
underpass; this act should be strictly construed the grant of immunity in this section Hansen 
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it v. Salt Lake County, 794 P 2d 838 (Utah 1990) 
63-30-7. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, <* 10 repeals negligent operation of motor vehicles, with ex-
§ 63-30-7, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. ceptions, effective April 29, 1991. 
204, *) 1, waiving immunity for injury from 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, 
viaduct, or other structure located on them. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8; 1991, ch. 76, the injury arises out of one or more of the ex-
§ 2. ceptions to waiver set forth in Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 63-30-10," and made several stylistic changes 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless 
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CHAPTER 34 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Section 
78-34-1. 
78-34-2. 
78-34-3. 
78-34-4. 
78-34-5. 
78-34-6. 
78-34-7. 
78-34-8 
78-34-9. 
78-34-10. 
78-34-11. 
78-34-12. 
Uses for which right may be exer-
cised. 
Estates and rights that may be 
taken. 
Private property which may be 
taken. 
Conditions precedent to taking. 
Right of entry for survey and loca-
tion. 
Complaint — Contents. 
Who may appear and defend. 
Powers of court or judge. 
Occupancy of premises pending 
action — Deposit paid into 
court — Procedure for payment 
of compensation. 
Compensation and damages — 
How assessed. 
When right to damages deemed to 
have accrued. 
When title sought found defective 
— Another action allowed 
Section 
78-34-13. 
78-34-14 
78-34-15. 
78-34-16. 
78-34-17 
78-34-18. 
78-34-19. 
78-34-20 
Payment of award — Bond from 
railroad to secure fencing. 
Distribution of award — Execu-
tion — Annulment of proceed-
ings on failure to pay. 
Judgment of condemnation — Re-
cordation — Effect. 
Substitution of bond for deposit 
paid into court — Abandon-
ment of action by condemner — 
Conditions of dismissal 
Rights of cities and towns not af-
fected. 
When right of way acquired — 
Duty of party acquiring. 
Action to set aside condemnation 
for failure to commence or com-
plete construction within rea-
sonable time. 
Sale of property acquired by emi-
nent domain. 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may 
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses: 
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the United States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other 
public uses authorized by the Legislature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or 
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, 
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabit-
ants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of any 
county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams, 
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straighten-
ing their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for 
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants 
thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, 
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction 
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and 
railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aq-
ueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or 
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other 
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of 
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or 
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of min-
erals in solution. 
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(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and 
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of 
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits 
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the de-
posit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other 
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or 
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal 
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface s t ratum or forma-
tion in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in con-
nection therewith such other interests in property as may be required 
adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground 
natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facil-
ities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in com-
mon by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, 
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, 
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms. 
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and 
sites for electric light and power plants. 
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than 
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any 
college or university. 
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for 
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the pur-
pose of generating and transmitt ing electricity for power, light or heat. 
(11) Cemeteries and public parks. 
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids con-
nected with the manufacture of beet sugar. 
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores 
and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to 
take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and 
dust therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that 
the powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any 
county where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile 
of the limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed 
condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or 
easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value of land acreage owned by 
persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the 
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the 
limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, ease-
ments or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of 
land within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill, 
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall 
have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or 
other works for the reduction of ores. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Corporations, property and franchises sub-
Supp., 104-34-1; L. 1957, ch. 174, § 1; 1963, ject to condemnation, Utah Const., Art. XII, 
ch. 193, § 1; 1969, ch. 258, § 1; 1973, ch. 206, Sec. 11. 
§ 1; 1981, ch. 164, § 1. County improvement districts, § 17A-2-312. 
Cross-References. — Airports, §§ 2-2-5, County service areas, § 17A-2-412. 
2-2-9, 2-2-10, 2-4-13. Ditches, reservoirs, etc., § 73-1-6. 
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was "incarcerated" since she had not sought 
release and had she done so, superintendent 
could obtain court order preventing her re-
lease Emery v State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P 2d 
1296 (1971) 
State's immunity from suit was waived un-
der this section in action alleging negligent 
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist 
and psychologist at university medical center 
Frank v State, 613 P 2d 517 (Utah 1980) 
Trees negligently cut. 
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for 
damage sustained by abutting homeowner 
when trees were blown down as result of un-
necessary and negligent cutting of roots Mor-
n s v Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P 373 
(1909) 
Vehicle title certificate. 
A lender's complaint against the State Tax 
Commission, claiming that the commission 
and its employees negligently failed to advise 
the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had 
been issued and that it had improperly issued 
to the borrower the title certificate upon which 
the lender relied in making its loan, was 
barred by governmental immunity The issu-
ance of motor vehicle titles and recordkeeping 
responsibilities are governmental functions 
and have immunity under *> 63-30-3 Further, 
the statutory waiver of immunity for negli-
gence does not apply, under Subsection (3) of 
this section, when the alleged injury arises out 
of the issuance of a title certificate Metropoli-
tan Fin Co v State, 714 P 2d 293 (Utah 1986) 
Cited in Ingram v Salt Lake City, 733 P 2d 
126 (Utah 1987), Maddocks v Salt Lake City 
Corp , 740 P 2d 1337 (Utah 1987), Loveland v 
Orem City Corp, 746 P 2d 763 (Utah 1987), 
Birkner v Salt Lake County, 771 P 2d 1053 
(Utah 1989), Prows v State, 822 P 2d 764 
(Utah 1991), Bruner v Rasmussen, 792 F 
Supp 731 (D Utah 1992) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Misapplication of 
Governmental Immunity — Epting v Utah, 
1976 Utah L Rev 186 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — 
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 
J Energy L & PoVy 95 (1987) 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for build-
ing inspector's negligent performance of duties, 
41 A L R 3 d 567 
Validity and construction of statute autho-
rizing or requiring governmental unit to in-
demnify public officer or employee for liability 
arising out of performance of public duties, 71 
A L R 3d 90 
Governmental tort liability for failure to pro-
vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A L R 4th 948 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A L R 4th 287 
Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negli-
gence of physician or surgeon, 51 A L R 4th 
235 
Municipal liability for negligent fire inspec-
tion and subsequent enforcement, 69 A L R 4th 
739 
Admissibility of evidence of polygraph test 
results, or offer or refusal to take test, in action 
for malicious prosecution, 10 A L R 5th 663 
Applicability of libel and slander exception 
to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal 
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS * 2680(h)), 79 
A L R Fed 826 
Applicability of 28 USCS N 2680(a) and 
2680(h) to Federal Tort Claims Act liability 
arising out of government informant's conduct, 
85 A L R Fed 848 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private prop-
erty without compensation. 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity 
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensa-
tion from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the require-
ments of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 75, * 3; 1991, ch. 76, * 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "As pro-
vided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Con-
stitution," and inserted for public uses" in 
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. wool, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, 
1931, ch. 54, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, § 10-102. 
33-4-1 to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in 
lands. 25-5-7. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless writ-
ten and signed. 25-5-8. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third 
person. 25-5-9. 
another — When not required to 
be in writing. 
Contracts by telegraph deemed writ-
ten. 
Right to specific performance not af-
fected. 
Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or 
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto autho-
rized by writing. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 33-5-1. 
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of 
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in ab-
sence of some writing, § 70A-2-201. 
Enforceability of security interests, § 70A-9-
203. 
Securities sales, statute of frauds for con-
tracts, § 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal prop-
erty not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adjoining landowners. 
Agent's authority. 
Blank deeds or papers. 
Construction and application. 
Contents of deed. 
Corporate officers. 
Custom and usage. 
Dedication of land. 
Defenses to action on contract. 
Easements. 
Gias. 
Interest in real property. 
Leases. 
Modifications of contract. 
Mortgages. 
Nature of required writing. 
Option to purchase. 
Oral contracts to buy or sell land. 
—Recovery of money paid. 
Parol executed agreement. 
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